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NOTES
NLRB DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE SPIELBERG DOCTRINE
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board) administers the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or the Act).1 A primary duty of the NLRB is to ensure the
legal and fair resolution of disputes that parties have agreed to
submit to arbitration. One of the major questions concerning the
proper relationship of the arbitral process to the NLRB is the subject of concurrent jurisdiction between an arbitrator and the Board
over the resolution of labor disputes. Interpretation and enforcement of contract provisions in a collective bargaining agreement
are the duties of an arbitrator; resolution of unfair labor practice
disputes is the function of the NLRB. The jurisdictions of an arbitrator and the Board often overlap, however, because most grievances asserted under the terms of an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement also can be charged as unfair labor
practices under the Act 2 and thus are within the jurisdiction of the
NLRB. 3 This problem of overlapping jurisdiction between arbitrators and the NLRB is further complicated because most collective
bargaining agreements incorporate provisions of the NLRA, thus
rendering many breaches of collective bargaining agreements viola1. National Labor Relations Act §§ 1-16, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
The Act in pertinent part provides: "The Board is empowered
to prevent any person
from engaging in any unfair labor practice
affecting commerce. This power shall not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise
"Id. at § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). See
generally Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451, 1452 (1961).
2. Section 8 of the Act describes acts comprising unfair labor practices. National Labor
Relations Act § 8, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976).
3. THE ARBITRATOR, THE N.L.R.B., AND THE COURTS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 121-22 (1967) (Statement made by E.
Lewis during workshop session).
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tions of the NLRA as well.4 The question thus arises whether, as a
matter of policy, the NLRB should defer to the decision of the
parties' arbitrator, to which the parties have agreed contractually
to be bound, or whether the NLRB should assume jurisdiction, either before or after arbitration, and settle the suit.
Resolution of the concurrent jurisdiction issue requires an accommodation of two competing policies. On the one hazid, Congress has stated that "[f]inal adjustment by a method agreed upon
by the parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement
oi grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation
of an existing collective bargaining agreement."'5 Similarly, the Supreme Court has emphasized the central role that arbitration plays
in our national labor policy,6 and has acknowledged the considerable discretion of the Board to defer to an arbitration award and to
decline to exercise its authority over alleged unfair labor practices
if, in the Board's opinion, declining jurisdiction will serve the aims
of the NLRA.7 These congressional and Supreme Court declarations, in turn, have encouraged the NLRB to extend substantial
deference to arbitration awards because submission to grievance
and arbitration proceedings of disputes that might involve unfair
labor practices would be discouraged substantially if the disputants thought the Board might give de novo consideration to an
issue that an arbitrator could resolve.'
On the other hand, in section 10(a) of the NLRA, Congress gave
the Board the power to prevent any person from engaging in unfair
labor practices and provided that "[t]his power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has
4. See, e.g., Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional
Problems, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 52, 68-69 (1957).
5. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976).
6. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail
Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95
(1962); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). See generally Freed, Injunctions Against Sympathy
Strikes: In Defense of Buffalo Forge, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 289 (1979).
7. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1964). The Board has recognized
expressly that its wide discretion to defer to arbitration is "well established." International
Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155, 1156 (1962), aff'd sub nom.
Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir. 1963).
8. Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise.""
Hence, the Board has authority to consider unfair labor practice
allegations even though an arbitrator can rule or has ruled on the
same charges. In this regard, the Supreme Court has determined
that the Board is not bound by an arbitration award,1 0 and numerous courts have determined that the Board can fashion its own
remedies in order to effectuate the NLRA mandate to prevent unfair labor practices.1 Accordingly, the Board has disregarded arbitration awards that conflict with the NLRA or challenge the integrity of the Board.' 2
The Board currently defers to arbitration or other private settlements in appropriate circumstances. The underlying rationale of
this deferral policy is the Board's desire to avoid duplicating an
arbitrator's efforts when the Board processes an unfair labor practice claim.' 3 In addition, by following this policy the Board can
lighten its heavy workload. The issue is not efficiency, however, but
whether Congress intended to invest the Board with exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practice disputes or to permit concurrent jurisdiction between the Board and an arbitrator, which sometimes could lead to dual litigation. 4 Although an argument has
been made in favor of the Board's exclusive jurisdiction,1 5 congressional silence in the wake of the Board's development of deferral
policy implies congressional approval of that policy. 6 Additionally,

9. National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976). The courts have interpreted this section as conferring exclusive power upon the Board both to prevent unfair
labor practices and to bring proceedings for violation of court decrees directing enforcement
of Board orders. See, e.g., Amalgamated Util. Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S.
261, 264-65 (1940).
10. See, e.g., NLRB v. Plasterer's Local 79, 404 U.S. 116 (1971).
11. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945); NLRB v. International
Longshoremen's Local 27, 514 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Walt Disney Prods.,
146 F.2d 44, 48 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1946).
12. Monsanto Chem. Co., 130' N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451, 1452 (1961). See
also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 n.13 (1974); Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 501, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370, 1371
(1946).
14. This theory of dual litigation is known as "two bites of the apple." See, e.g., Electronic Reprod. Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974).
15. See note 33 & accompanying text infra.
16. Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415, 420 (4th Cir. 1981). See also William
E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 17 (1974).
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the courts have interpreted section 10 of the NLRA as giving the
Board a discretionary right to exercise its jurisdiction in disputes
involving unfair labor practices. 17 Nonetheless, when the Board
and an arbitrator reach different results, the Board's decison
prevails.' 8
The basis of the postarbitral deferral policy is Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 19 in which the Board determined that it would defer
to an existing arbitration award and dismiss an unfair labor practice charge if "the [arbitration] proceedings appear to have been
fair and regular, all parties agreed to be bound, and the decision of
the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the Act."2 0 The Board later added another factor to the
Spielberg test by asking whether the arbitrator considered and
ruled on the unfair labor practice issue. 2 '
The Board subsequently extended the Spielberg doctrine to the
prearbitral setting in Collyer Insulated Wire,2 2 stating that the
Board would defer prospectively to an arbitration award that satisfied the Spielberg criteria. Nevertheless, the Board reserved jurisdiction to review the arbitral award subject to the Spielberg criteria.2 3 Although a majority of the Board later rejected the Collyer
prearbitral deferral policy as applied to individual rights cases
under sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) of the Act,2 4 the Spielberg defer-

17. See NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. NLRB, 418 F.2d
203 (9th Cir. 1969); Lodge 743, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United Aircraft Corp., 337 F.2d 5
(2d Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Wagner Iron Works, 220 F.2d 126 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 981 (1956).
18. See, e.g., Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964); New Orleans
Typographical Union 17 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966).
19. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
20. Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1152; accord, Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S.
261 (1964); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962), a/f'd sub nom. Ramsey v.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
21. Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1963), enforcement dented on
other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964).
22. 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
23. Id. at 843, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938.
24. In General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977), two members of the Board rejected Collyer-type deferral to arbitration on the ground that such
deferral conflicted with the language and policy of the Act. Two members of the Board,
however, continued to support Collyer The Chairman, although continuing to adhere to
Spielberg, concurred with the decision not to defer on the ground that Collyer-type deferral
was inappropriate in individual rights cases arising primarily under sections 8(a)(1) and
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ral doctrine appears to be a firmly established NLRB policy. The
careful balance struck in Spielberg, however, has endured decisions that have eroded the Board's discretion to hear various unfair labor practice issues, 25 which, in some cases, have2been labelled
an abdication of Board authority and responsibility.
Time and the complexity of labor relations have subjected the
Spielberg doctrine to applications and modifications not envisaged
in the original decision. In order to curb a runaway trend of deferral to arbitration and to protect the public's need for access to a
public forum, two federal courts of appeal would add two additional requirements to the Spielberg test: that the arbitrator
"clearly decided" the unfair labor practice issue on which the
Board later is urged to give deference, and that the arbitrator decided only issues within its competence.27 This Note will review the
effect of judicial opinions on the NLRB's development of the
Spielberg deferral doctrine and examine the propriety of the
Board's present deferral policy.
PRE-Spielberg DEFERRAL
When Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act 28 m
1935, it sought to proscribe unfair labor practices29 that interfered
with an employee's section 7 rights to bargain collectively without
undue influence or interference from management.5 0 Section 10 of
the Act, which empowered the Board to remedy unfair labor prac8(a)(3) of the Act. Cf. Filmation Assocs., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1721, 94 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1977)
(Spielberg held inapplicable to cases arising under section 8(a)(4) of the Act). See also Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 98 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1978).
25. See, for example, Electronic Reprod. Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211
(1974), discussed at notes 147-61 & accompanying text infra.
26. See, e.g., Local 2188, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1087, 1091 (1974); Fikse Bros., 220
N.L.R.B. 1301, 1301-02, 90 L.R.R.M. 1354, 1355-56 (1975) (Fanning, Member, dissenting);
National Tea Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 614, 615, 80 L.R.R.M. 1736, 1738 (1972). See generally,
Belkin, Are Arbitrators Qualified to Decide Unfair Labor PracticeCases?, 24 LAB. L.J. 818,
819-20 (1973).
27. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977); Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d
342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
28. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
29. Section 8 of the NLRA enumerates the conduct that comprises unfair labor practices.
Id. § 8 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976)).
30. Id. § 7 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976)).
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tices,3 1 was silent on the Board's right to defer to the arbitration
process. When the original bill was drafted, however, Senator Wagner proposed that section 10 include the proviso that "[tihe Board
may, in its discretion, defer its exercise or [sic] jurisdiction over
any such unfair labor practice in any case where there is another
means of prevention provided for by agreement. ' 32 This deferral
language was deleted prior to final enactment, indicating some
congressional opposition to deferral.33
Initially, the NLRB refused to defer to the judgments of arbitrators.3 4 In 1943, in Consolidated Aircraft Corp.,3 5 however, the
Board for the first time decided to defer rather than to exercise its
jurisdiction. Consolidated Aircraft concerned an unfair labor practice allegation arising from a collective bargaining agreement. The
Board regarded the dispute as one of contract interpretation and
stated that it did "not deem it wise to exercise [its] jurisdiction
where the parties have not exhausted their rights and remedies under the contract as to which the dispute has arisen."3 6 The
NLRB thus sought to encourage the settlement of collective bargaining contract interpretation and administration difficulties
through arbitration rather than through submission to the NLRB.
One of the early cases supporting the Board's present policy of
deferring to arbitration was Timken Roller Bearing Co.37 In
Timken, the Board refused to exercise its jurisdiction in deference
to an arbitrator's award, even though an unfair labor practice apparently had occurred, The Board held that the union could not
invoke the NLRB's assistance after having initiated arbitration

31. Id. § 10 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1976)).
32. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 10(b), 79 CONG. REc. 2369 (1935).
33. See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 535, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718, 1726 (1972) (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
34. In Rieke Metal Prods. Corp., 40 N.L.R.B. 867, 10 L.R.R.M. 82 (1942), the employer
contended that the arbitration award estopped the union from instituting action in an
NLRB proceeding. The Board disagreed, however, stating that its jurisdiction was "concerned not with private rights, but rather with enforcement of a public policy over which the
Board, pursuant to section 10(a) of the Act, has exclusive jurisdiction, 'not affected by any
other means of adjustment.'" Id. at 874, 10 L.R.R.M. at 82 (footnote omitted).
35. 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 12 L.R.R.M. 44 (1943), enforced in pertinent part, 141 F.2d 785 (9th
Cir. 1944).
36. Id. at 706, 12 L.R.R.M. at 45; see 6 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 720, 725 (1972).
37. 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946), rev'd on other grounds, 161 F.2d 949 (6th
Cir. 1947).
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proceedings that resulted in a decision on the merits."' Although
the Board implied that its refusal to assert jurisdiction was based
more on the union's election of remedies than on the weight of the
arbitrator's award, 9 Timken illustrates that the Board was willing
to recognize the arbitrator's authority and competence.
In 1947 the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), also
known as the Taft-Hartley Act,4 0 amended the !',LRA. Section 3d
of the LMRA41 authorized judicial enforcement 6f any contract between an employer and a labor union, and section 203(d) of the
LMRA42 stated that arbitration enjoyed a preferred position in labor law. Arguably, sections 301 and 203(d) override section 10(a) of
the Act4" and indicate a congressional intent to encourage arbitration.44 In addition, section 14(c) 41 of the amended Act authorizes
the Board to decline jurisdiction if, in the opinion of the Board, its
decision to decline jurisdiction would not have a substantial effect
on commerce.
THE

Spielberg DEFERRAL

DOCTRINE

In 1955, in Spielberg Manufacturing Co.,46 the Board attempted
to resolve the overlapping jurisdiction problem between arbitrators
and the NLRB by developing a three-pronged test to determine
whether deferral was appropriate in a particular case. According to
the test developed in Spielberg, the Board would decline to exercise its jurisdiction and would defer to an arbitrator's award if
"[t]he proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties
had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel
is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act."4

38. Id. at 501, 18 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
39. Id.
40. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-168, 171-187 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
41. Id. § 301(a), 61 Stat. 156 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976)).
42. Id. § 203(d), 61 Stat. 154 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976)). See text
accompanying note 5 supra. See also Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974);
Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1973).
43. See note 9 & accompanying text supra.
44. See generally Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 449-56 (1957).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1976).
46. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
47. Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153; accord, Local 715, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers v.
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Accordingly, the Spielberg deferral policy represented the Board's
view that "the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor disputes will best be served by our recognition of
' '4
the arbitrators' award. 8
In Spielberg, the employer and the union agreed to arbitrate a
dispute over the reinstatement of four workers who were discharged for picket line misconduct during a strike.49 The parties
agreed to be bound by a majority decision of a three-person arbitration panel.50 Two of the arbitrators held that the employer did
not have to reinstate the discharged employees.5 1 Subsequently,
the union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board,
which dismissed the complaint on the basis of the three above52
mentioned criteria.
Underlying the Board's decision in Spielberg were the policies of
furthering the voluntary resolution of labor disputes, leaving the
parties to the method of dispute resolution mutually agreed upon,
and avoiding an unjust and costly result were the respondent reqired to defend himself in two forums on the same charge.5 3 Although critics regarded Spielberg as the initial step toward abdication of the Board's authority,54 supporters of Spielberg maintained
that the third prong of the Spielberg test provided an adequate
safeguard against abuse or abdication of authority 5 5 Nonetheless,
the Spielberg doctrine rarely has been criticized. 6 In any event,

NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886, 52
L.R.R.M. 1129, 1131 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964); Comment,
The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191, 1192 (1968).
48. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. See also Wertheimer Stores Corp., 107
N.L.R.B. 1434, 33 L.R.R.M. 1398 (1954); Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517, 29
L.R.R.M. 1126 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1953).
49. 112 N.L.R.B. at 1081, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1154.
50. Id. at 1081, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153.
53. See notes 13, 14 & accompanying text supra.
54. See, e.g., Simon-Rose, Deferral Under Collyer by the N.L.R.B. of Section 8(a)(3)
Cases, 27 LAB. L.J. 201, 211-13 (1976).
55. Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See generally Comment, supra note 47.
56. Siegel, N.L.R.B. Deferral to Arbitration in Unfair Labor Practices, in PROCEEDINGS
OF NEW YORK UNivERsITY TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 19, 31 (1974) ("I
recently had the occasion
to research every Supreme Court comment on Spielberg. I
have yet to find an adverse Supreme Court comment on Spielberg.").
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the Board's decision in Spielberg that deferral was appropriate was
made easier by the close relationship between factual and statutory questions presented in the case and by the fact that the issues
before the NLRB clearly had been decided in the earlier arbitration proceedings.5 7 The decades following Spielberg raised the
more difficult questions of whether deferral was appropriate when
the statutory and factual questions were not closely related and
whether deferral was appropriate if the issue was not clearly decided in arbitration.58 As a result, the Spielberg doctrine was modified, interpreted, and adjusted as the NLRB sought to apply the
three Spielberg criteria to areas not originally contemplated by the
Board in its Spielberg decision.59
EXPANDING THE

Spielberg DEFERRAL

DOCTRINE

Based upon its underlying policy considerations, a steady expansion of the Spielberg doctrine occurred in the 1960's.60 In 1960 the
Supreme Court narrowed the scope of judicial review of arbitration
awards in the Steelworkers Trilogy,6 1 declaring the arbitrator's expertise as superior to that of the "ablest judge." 2 Although the
Court did not address explicitly the relationship between the arbi57. See Simon-Rose, supra note 54, at 203.
58. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977); Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.,
247 N.L.R.B. -, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980); Atlantic Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 102
L.R.R.M. 1247 (1979); cf. National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972)
(first case to deal with a dispute that did not have intertwined statutory and contractual
issues), overruled, General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977).
59. See Local 715, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136, 1137-38 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) for an illustration of the breadth with which courts have interpreted the
Spielberg doctrine. See also Covington, Arbitratorsand the Board: A Revised Relationship,
57 N.C.L. Rav. 91 (1978) (suggesting a doctrine for accommodation).
60. See, e.g., Local 1522, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 180 N.L.R.B. 131, 73 L.R.R.M.
1091 (1969); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962), afl'd
sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964). This
expansion reached full proportions m the 1970's in decisions such as Electronic Reprod.
Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974), overruled, Suburban Motor
Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. -, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980), and National Radio Co., 198
N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972), overruled, General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B.
808, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977).
61. The Steelworkers Trilogy consisted of United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
62. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
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trator and the NLRB in disputes involving collective bargaining
agreements, the Court's unqualified praise of the arbitral process
as a technique for settling a wide range of labor disputes had significant impact on the Board.
In the wake of the Supreme Court's praise of arbitration expressed in the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Board extended the
Spielberg doctrine's applicability in InternationalHarvester Co.6 3
In International Harvester, the Board determined that it would
"voluntarily withhold" its authority to adjudicate statutory unfair
labor practice claims arising from the same facts as an arbitrated
contract dispute "unless it clearly appears that the arbitration proceedings were tainted by fraud, collusion, unfairness, or serious
procedural irregularities or that the award was clearly repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the Act."6' 4 The Board elaborated
upon the "clearly repugnant" criterion by stating that the arbitrator's findings of law and fact would stand unless "palpably
wrong." 6 5
In International Harvester the employee claimed that his seniority had been reduced improperly by the arbitrator.6 6 In arbitration the employer represented the employee in his dispute with
the union, but the employee was not present at the arbitration
hearing because he was never notified. This lack of notice caused
the employee to lose the opportunity to present evidence on his
own behalf and to examine witnesses. Nevertheless, the Board deferred to the arbitrator's decision because the record indicated no
fraud, collusion, or serious procedural infirmity had been present
during arbitration. 6 Under these circumstances the question arises
how an aggrieved employee can be expected to show fraud, collusion, unfairness, or whatever might constitute "serious procedural

63. 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327
F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
64. Id. at 927, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1157. By adopting this policy the Board altered the language of Spielberg.See Comment, supra note 47, at 1192, which suggests that International
Harvester was a drastic extension, instead of a mere variance, of the Spielberg doctrine.
65. 138 N.L.R.B. at 928-29, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1158. But cf. Comment, supra note 47, at 1206
(arguing that this standard was a "remarkable misdelegation of authority").
66. 138 N.L.R.B. at 924-25, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1156.
67. Id. at 928, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
68. Id.
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irregularities."6 9 InternationalHarvester thus indicated the Board
was willing to compromise employee rights in order to maintain a
liberal deferral policy
By 1962 the basic premise of national labor policy as determined
by the Supreme Court and the Board was the promotion of mdustrial peace through collective bargaining and arbitration.7 0 Consequently, the interests of labor and management further compromised individual employee rights in the name of deferral to
arbitration.71 Moreover, the Supreme Court applauded the liberal
deferral policy of InternationalHarvester in its 1964 decision of
Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.72 In Carey, the Court compelled an employer to arbitrate an inter-union dispute although
the Court conceded that the arbitrator's decision may not put an
end to the dispute.
The expanded deferral policy established in InternationalHarvester was never effectively put into practice, however, and after
the Supreme Court decided Carey the Board began to restrict the
application of the Spielberg doctrine. 3 Accordingly, the Board added a fourth consideration to the Spielberg test, conditioning
deferral on whether the arbitrator had considered the unfair labor
practice issue. The Board made this fourth requirement a part of
the deferral criteria in Monsanto
Chemical Co.,"4 which the Board
5
reaffirmed in Raytheon Co."

69. Novack, Cutting Back on Collyer: The First Step in the Right Direction, 28 LAB. L.J.
785, 790 (1977).
70. See United Steelworkers v. Warner & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); International Harvester Co., 138
N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962), aff'd sub noma. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 784 (7th
Cir. 1963).
71. See Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and N.L.R.B. Deference, 20 BUFF.
L. REV. 355, 375-84 (1971).
72. 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
73. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 768, 64 L.R.R.M. 1082 (1967). Between 1960 and 1964, the Board deferred in only 23% of the cases in which arbitration was
discussed. Comment, supra note 47, at 1193. This statistic, however, does not account for
the many cases in which the General Counsel, acting as the prosecutorial arm of the NLRB
in the precomplaint stage, concluded that the Board presumably would defer to an arbitrator's decision. See Truesdale, Is Spielberg Dead?, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY
THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR

47, 51-52 (1978).

74. 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1961).
75. 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1963), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471 (1st
Cir. 1964). See also Airco Indus. Gases-Pac., 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 79 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1972).
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In Monsanto Chemical the arbitrator specifically declined to
pass on the issues regarded by the arbitrator as statutory rather
than contractual. 6 The Board declined to defer to the arbitrator's
award and sustained a discharge action taken by the employer because the arbitrator refused to consider the allegation that union
activities played a part in the discharge."
In Raytheon Co., 78 the trial examiner overturned an arbitration
award upholding the discharge of two employees for inciting a
work stoppage in violation of a no-strike provision. The award was
overturned because the arbitrator decided only the contractual issue of whether the employees had violated the no-strike clause of
their contract and not the statutory issue of whether the employees had engaged in a concerted activity protected by the LMRA.
Thus, as in Monsanto,79 the Board rejected the arbitrator's decision because the arbitrator had not considered the unfair labor
practice issue. 0 Although the Board's decision was reversed on appeal,8 the reversal was not due to the Board's use of the more
restrictive Monsanto deferral policy 82 Hence, the more restrictive
Monsanto deferral criteria were established firmly as a Board
policy
Further impetus for a tightened deferral policy came from the
Supreme Court m NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp.8 S and NLRB v.

76. 130 N.L.R.B. at 1099, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1452. See Brown, The National Labor Policy,
the NLRB and Arbitration, in DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 83,

85-87 (1968), for a more detailed discussion of this situation.
77. 130 N.L.R.B. at 1099, 47 L.R.R.M. at 1452.
78. 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1963).
79. See notes 74-77 & accompanying text supra.
80. 140 N.L.R.B. at 884-85, 52 L.R.R.M. at 1130.
81. Raytheon Co. v. NLRB, 326 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1964).
82. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the Board's order,
which held discharge of two employees violative of provisions of the LMRA, because the
Board misconstrued the question before it. Id. at 475. The questions properly before the
Board in determining the propriety of the discharge were what the employer believed and
not whether that belief was reasonable, and whether the employer's representative was telling the truth when he said he believed the employees upon whom the employer's representative relied and not whether the examiner felt that these employees were unworthy witnesses. Id. Thus, the court based its reversal of the Board's order on questions of fact not
related to the Board's newly restricted deferral policy.
83. 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
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Acme Industrial Co.,s4 which together suggested that Board inter-

vention was proper in contractual disputes notwithstanding collective bargaining agreement provisions for handling labor disagreements. In C & C Plywood, the Court held that the Board need not
defer to arbitration in an unfair labor practice situation despite the
fact that the NLRB's decision to assume jurisdiction required the
NLRB to interpret a provision of the collective bargaining agreement relied on as a defense by the employer.8 5 In Acme Industrial,
the Court held that a binding arbitration provision in a collective
bargaining agreement did not preclude the Board from directing
the employer to produce information needed by the bargaining
representative in the proper performance of its representative duties.8 6 Accordingly, in both C & C Plywood and Acme Industrial,
the Court affirmed an NLRB policy of interjecting itself into the
contractual dispute resolution arena.87
The Board did not ignore the Supreme Court's preference for a
less restrictive deferral policy as expressed in C & C Plywood and
8 In Unit Drop Forge,s9 for example, the
Acme Industrial."
Board
accepted jurisdiction despite the availability of arbitration, explaining that action was necessary because of an unduly long delay
The Board said that it would regard as no more than secondary
any contract interpretation aspect of what is regarded basically as
an unfair labor practice dispute.90 Furthermore, the Board declared that the availability of arbitration was not intended to preclude the Board from exercising its undoubted authority, as mandated by Congress, to assert jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices. 9 1
By 1970, however, the NLRB had abandoned its contracted
deferral policy In Local 1522, InternationalBrotherhood of Elec-

84. 385 U.S. 432 (1967).
85. NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. at 427-28.
86. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. at 438.
87. See Zimmer, Wired for Collyer: RationalizingNLRB and ArbitrationJurisdiction,48
IND. L.J. 141, 157-60 (1973), for a discussion of NLRB interjection into the area of contract
interpretation.
88. See, e.g., Eastern Ill. Gas & Sec. Co., 175 N.L.R.B. 639, 71 L.R.R.M. 1035 (1969);
Producers Grain Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. 466, 67 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1968).
89. 171 N.L.R.B. 600, 68 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1968).
90. Id. at 602, 68 L.R.R.M. at 1131-32.
91. Id.
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trical Workers,9" the Board held that new information raised in an
unfair labor practice hearing may not be sufficient reason to ignore
the previously rendered arbitration award.9 3 This Board decision
and the Supreme Court's about-face in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 77094 ushered in a new era of deference to the
arbitration process.
In Boys Markets, the Supreme Court emphatically reiterated the
strong preference for the use of available grievance procedures as
the Court first had enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy 5 Although the courts always possessed the authority to enjoin strike
violence, 96 until Boys Markets the Court interpreted the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-La Guardia Act 97 as preventing

the enjoining of peaceful picketing even though the collective bargaining agreement provided for mandatory arbitration of the grievance dispute that caused the strike." Because the Court desired to
facilitate the congressional policy favoring the voluntary establishment of mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes,
the Court in Boys Markets expressly overruled its earlier precedent to the contrary99 and held that under section 30(a) of the
LMRA, 10 0 a peaceful strike can be enjoined when the contract contains no-strike and binding arbitration clauses, the strike causes
irreparable harm, and a request to invoke available grievance procedures has been refused. 101
92. 180 N.L.R.B. 131, 73 L.R.R.M. 1091 (1969).
93. Id. at 132, 136-37, 73 L.R.R.M. at 1091-92.
94. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
95. Id. at 252-53.
96. See F FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts-PartI: A Survey, 50 VA. L. REV. 951 (1964).
97. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101115 (1976)).
98. See, e.g., Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
99. The Supreme Court expressly overruled its opinion in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), which held that § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred a federal
district court from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement even though the agreement contained binding arbitration provisions enforceable under § 301(a) of the LMRA. 398 U.S. at 238.
100. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
101. 398 U.S. at 254.
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Extension of Deferral to the PrearbitralSetting
The NLRB formulated the Spielberg doctrine to determine
whether deferral to completed arbitral decisions was proper; 1 2 the
Board had not applied consistently the Spielberg deferral policy in
situations where the contractual grievance and arbitration systems
available to the parties had not been used.'0 3 In particular, the
Board drew no distinction for deferral purposes between cases in
which arbitration was pending and cases in which arbitration had
been discontinued or had never been mitiated. 04 The Board, perhaps recognizing the inconsistency in maintaining a deferral policy
that purported to effectuate national labor policy through private
settlements yet which did not promote actively the use of those
private means of dispute resolution in the first instance, 10 5 began
to modify its deferral policy in Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.'0 6
In Jos. Schlitz, the Board refused to exercise its jurisdiction over
an alleged unfair labor practice because the interpretation and implementation of the provision in question, if found objectionable
by the union, should have been arbitrated pursuant to the procedures mutually agreed upon.0 7 Under the circumstances, if the collective bargaining agreement provided for grievance and arbitration machinery and the arbitration process likely would have
resolved both the unfair labor practice issue and the contract interpretation issue consistently with the purposes of the Act, the
Board would refuse to assert jurisdiction and would require the
parties to arbitrate the dispute. The Jos. Schlitz criteria, however,
could not be met if, given the circumstances, arbitration would be

102. See Note, Alexander v. Gardner-Denverand Deferral to Labor Arbitration, 27 HASL.J. 403, 408 (1975).
103. The Board occasionally implemented the Spielberg doctrine in the prearbitral setting. See Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561, 57 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1964); Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142
N.L.R.B. 431, 53 L.R.R.M. 1158 (1963). In Dubo the Board deferred to a pending but unresolved arbitration proceeding. Subsequently, however, the Board accepted jurisdiction and
decided the unfair labor practice charges. See NLRB v. Dubo Mfg. Corp., 353 F.2d 157, 16061 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (granting petition for enforcement).
104. See Comment, NLRB and Private Arbitration:Should Collyer Be Extended to EmTINGS

ployee Discipline Cases, 13 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 1460, 1462-63 (1972).

105. Id. at 1463.
106. 175 N.L.R.B. 141, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1969).
107. Id. at 142, 70 L.R.R.M. at 1473.
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futile. 108 Thus, the Board in Jos. Schlitz exhibited its reluctance to
assert jurisdiction of disputes if arbitration, although available,
had been bypassed.
In Collyer Insulated Wire Co.,10 9 the Board reaffirmed the Jos.
Schlitz rationale and expanded the deferral concept to include the
requirement that parties involved in disputes use contractually
agreed upon methods of arbitration prior to seeking Board review.
Significantly, both Boys Markets and Jos. Schlitz are cited prominently m Collyer, thus indicating the Board's recognition and implementation of the Supreme Court's Boys Markets preference for
private dispute resolution.110 After an erratic history of deferral,
the NLRB decided to defer uniformly, thus promulgating the Collyer doctrine.
Collyer Insulated Wire Co.
In Collyer, the Board found that the contract between the parties, and its meaning under the circumstances presented, was the
center of the dispute. The necessary determination, according to
the Board, clearly was within the expertise of a mutually agreed
upon arbitrator.1 1 In the Board's opinion,1 the Supreme Court
made clear that either party had available effective legal means to
ensure that arbitration would occur and suggested that the arbitration process had become the predominant forum for the administration of collective bargaining contracts. 3 Significantly, because
the Board realized its Jos. Schlitz-Collyer deferral policy was a
"developmental step" in the treatment of the overlapping jurisdic108. Id.

109. 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971).
110. Id. at 841-43, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1936-37.
111. Id. at 839, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1934.
112. The Board relied on Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964), which
applauded the Board's deference decision in InternationalHarvester,and on Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), in which the Supreme Court observed that in the past
the Board had declined to exercise its jurisdiction over unfair labor practices. 192 N.L.R.B.
at 840, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1934-35. InternationalHarvester and Evening News, however, are
distinguishable. InternationalHarvester dealt with a jurisdictional dispute which, under
§ 10(k) of the Act, the Board may refuse to hear by deferring to the agreed upon arbitration; Evening News held that when the collective bargaining agreement did not contain an
arbitration clause the courts had jurisdiction to hear a breach of contract claim that might
constitute an unfair labor practice.
113. 192 N.L.R.B. at 843, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1937.
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tion question,11 4 the Board in Collyer determined it would retain
jurisdiction and reconsider the disputants' allegations upon a
showing that either the problem had not been settled within a reasonable tine after the Collyer decision or that the arbitration procedures were unfair or had reached a result repugnant to the
115
NLRA.
The Collyer majority opinion generated strong dissenting opinions. Member Fanning regarded the majority position as verging
on "compulsory arbitration," exhorting that "[n]either Congress
nor the courts have attempted to coerce the parties in collective
bargaining to resolve their grievances through arbitration. M 16 In
addition, Member Fanning concluded that "the Board, with the
help of its staff and Trial Examiner, has more expertise and is
more competent to judge such a dispute in a manner to effectuate
the policies of the Act. 1 17 Finally, Member Fanning noted the potential problem of assuming that arbitrators, who were paid jointly
by a union and an employer to adjudicate private rights and obligations, would be willing to decide these private questions in accor11
dance with public rights or national labor policy.
Member Jenkins also dissented and observed that the majority's
decision was "a complete reversal of Board precedent."1 9 Member
Jenkins questioned how the Board could deny Board access to individuals who sought to vindicate public rights in light of the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Industrial Unon of Manne &
Shipbuilding Workers1 20 that unions could not impede an employee's access to the Board by internal union rules and discipline.1 2 In addition, Member Jenkins mentioned the prohibitive
costs of arbitration and the inability of arbitrators to provide
"cease and desist" orders and other binding remedies. 2 '
The majority decision in Collyer relied upon the same policy
114. Id. at 843, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1938. Notably, the Spielberg "agreed to be bound" criterion is now presumed m the existence of a contractual arbitration procedure.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 847, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1941-42 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
117. Id. at 848, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1942 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
118. Id. at 849, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1943 (Fanning, Member, dissenting).
119. Id. at 850, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1944 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
120. 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
121. 192 N.L.R.B. at 852, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1946 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
122. Id. at 854-55, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1948-49 (Jenkins, Member, dissenting).
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considerations underlying the Spielberg doctrine, that is, encouraging "the voluntary resolution by parties of their disputes
through their own agreed-upon methods.' 123 Even though the
Board's opinion in Collyer has been criticized, 1 24 the Supreme
the Board's discretionary power not
Court has discussed favorably
25
to exercise its jurisdiction.
When the unfair labor practice allegations grow out of differences between the parties as to the interpretation or application of
their collective bargaining agreement, the principal issue is
whether the complained of conduct is permitted by the parties'
contract. Complaints alleging violations of sections 8(a)(5) and
8(b)(3) of the Act 2 ' fall into this category Because no allegation of

interference with an individual employee's basic rights under section 7 of the Act' 27 is asserted, such issues are based on conduct
assertedly in derogation of the contract and properly are suited to
the arbitral process, resolution 12of which, as a rule, will dispose of
the unfair labor practice issue.
On the other hand, in cases alleging violations of sections

8(a)(3), 8(a)(1), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2), 29 which arguably also involve contract violations, the determinative issue is whether the
conduct was unlawfully motivated or whether it otherwise interfered with employees in the exercise of their rights under section 7

of the Act.'30 Statutory rights, unlike contractual rights, lawfully
cannot be reduced or eliminated by the employer, the union, or
123. 192 N.L.R.B. at 843-44, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1937-38.
124. See Getman, Collyer Insulated Wire: A Case of Misplaced Modesty, 49 IND. L.J. 55
(1973); Novack, supra note 69. See also note 209 infra.
125. William E. Arnold Co. v. Carpenters Dist. Council, 417 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1974).
126. Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(b)(3) of the Act prohibit a refusal to bargain collectively by an
employer and a union, respectively. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), (b)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3) (1976).
127. See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
128. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 810-11, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483, 1486 (1977)
(Murphy, Chairman, concurring). See also Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 94
L.R.R.M. 1474 (1977).
129. Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2) of the Act prohibit discrimination in employment. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), (b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1976). Sections
8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1)(A) prohibit interference with an individual's rights under § 7 of the Act.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (1976).
130. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 811, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483, 1486 (1977)
(Murphy, Chairman, concurring).

1981]

NLRB DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION

both.131 As a result, because the central issue in such cases is not
whether the conduct was permitted by contract, an arbitrator's
resolution of the contract issue will not resolve necessarily the unfair labor practice issue. Nonetheless, the Board will defer to an
arbitrator's award under Spielberg if all of the parties, including
the affected employee, voluntarily have submitted the dispute to
arbitration. 1 2 Because the national policy in favor of labor arbitration is based upon the encouragement of the voluntary resolution
of disputes, 33 compelling an unwilling party to go to arbitration
when that party charges that an individual's section 7 rights have
been violated deprives that party of access to the Board's investigative and legal expertise.1 34 Nonetheless, less than a year after
Collyer the Board in National Radio13 5 extended prearbitral deferral to a case alleging violatons of sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5).
In National Radio, the contractual and statutory issues were not
necessarily coextensive. 3 " The Board deferred to arbitration despite the possibility that the acts of the employer could amount to
"no breach of [the contract] agreement, but [which would] nevertheless [be] prohibited by the Act because undertaken for a discriminatory motive. 1 137 Although the Board recognized that it

could be charged with abdicating its responsibility by deferring to
unrelated statutory considerations, it maintained that deference
was in the best interests of a "quick and fair vindication of employee rights."' 1 More importantly, the Board reasoned that, if
131. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
132. General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 813, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483, 1488 (1977)
(Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
133. See notes 5, 6 & accompanying text supra.
134. See Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. at 813, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1488 (Murphy,
Chairman, concurring).
135. 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972), overruled, General Am. Transp. Corp.,
228 N.L.R.B. 808, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977).
136. The majority, distinguishing National Radio from Collyer because in Collyer the
statutory and contractual issues overlapped, said it must tread cautiously because a possibility existed that "a contractually sound and entirely proper arbitrator's award might fail to
dispose of all issues arising under the Act." Id. at 530, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1721.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 530-31, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722. The majority added that "[tihe intervention of
this Board, by contrast, can sometimes be an unsettling force." Id. at 532, 80 L.R.R.M. at
1723. The dissent retorted: "[I]f the statutory protection is to be meaningful, of course
Board decisions finding unlawful conduct may be 'unsettling' to the parties who have agreed
to an arbitration provision
[T]he protection of statutory rights often requires more
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the parties in their collective bargaining agreement had agreed to
arbitration, they should "seek resolution of their dispute under the
provisions of their own contract." ' At the same time, the Board
continued to adhere to its retention of jurisdiction position as
stated in Collyer,14 0 reserving the authority to examine the fairness
of the award and its consistency with the policies of the Act.""
Given these circumstances, the Board refused to equate its abstention with abdication of responsibility.1 4 2
Members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting in National Radio,
declared that the majority's action amounted to nothing less than
a "subcontracting to a private tribunal of the determination of
rights conferred and guaranteed solely by the statute. Such action
mocks the statute and the reason for this Board's existence." 43
They also questioned the arbitrator's competence to decide tough
statutory questions with the same degree of expertise that the
Board could ensure under the NLRA. 44 The dissenting members
believed that such deferral discouraged uniformity of decisions, 45
and sacrificed the individual's right to a full Board review. 46 Given
the National Radio holding, few legal issues, if any, clearly fell
outside the Spielberg-Collyer deferral doctrine.
than the arbitrator is empowered to decide, or will award." Id. at 535, 80 L.R.R.M. at 172627 (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
139. Id. at 531, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722.
140. See note 115 & accompanying text supra.
141. 198 N.L.R.B. at 532, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1723 (retaining jurisdiction although dismissing
complaint).
142. Id. at 531, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1722.
143. Id. at 533, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1724 (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
144. Id. at 533, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1724-25 (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting). Members Fanning and Jenkins stated that the "special competence of arbitrators in contract
disputes
does not exist in the field of statutory rights.
[A]rbitrators do not have
the expertise in statutory issues which the Board has necessarily acquired through long,
intimate, and specialized experience." Id. at 533, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1725.
145. Id., accord, Local 2188, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, 494 F.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (dictum) ("Successive arbitration awards could produce a variety of ad hoc solutions to the same problem, all consistent with the Act, but no uniform rule. In such circumstances further abstention by the Board might be contrary to Federal labor policy."); Radiocar Corp., 199 N.L.R.B. 1161, 1163, 81 L.R.R.M. 1402, 1404 (1972) (Fanning & Jenkins,
Members, dissenting) ("The result will open the door to an erratic lack of uniformity in
areas in which legal principles rather than contract interpretation are at issue.").
146. 198 N.L.R.B. at 533, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1724-25; accord, Collyer Insulated Wire Co., 192
N.L.R.B. 837, 855, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931, 1949 (1971) (Jenkins, Member, dissenting); Pye, Collyer's Effect on the Individual Charging Party, 25 LAB. L.J. 561, 569 (1974).
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Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.
Subsequently, in the 1974 case of Electronc Reproductin Service Corp.,147 the contours of the deferral doctrine were expanded
14 8
further to include a principle similar to collateral estoppel:
henceforth, the Board would defer to arbitration awards in employee discharge or discipline cases 149 if a party could have
presented but elected not to present evidence to the arbitrator regarding any alleged unlawful discrimination, unless bona fide rea1 50
sons existed for the party's failure to present such evidence.
51
Against the weight of earlier Board decisions on point, the Board
in Electronic Reproduction held that when the Board deferred to
an arbitration award, the arbitrator would be presumed to have
determined adequately all related unfair labor practice claims unless "unusual circumstances" prevented the introduction of such
evidence.152 In effect, the Electronc Reproductin policy forced
147. 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974), overruled, Suburban Motor Freight, Inc.,
247 N.L.R.B. , 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980).
148. See Filmation Assocs., 227 N.L.R.B. 1721, 1724, 94 L.R.R.M. 1470, 1473 (1977)
(Penello & Walther, Members, dissenting) ("Moreover, like the doctrines of res judicata
and collateral estoppel, Spielberg is intended to promote economy of litigation. A party
having had the opportunity fairly to litigate an issue in one forum and lost ought not to be
permitted to try the same issue in another forum." (footnotes omitted)); cf. Cohen & Eaby,
The Gardner-DenverDecision and Labor Arbitration, 27 LAB. L.J. 18, 21 (1976) (judicial
deferral discussed in the context of Title VII questions); Johannesen & Smith, Collyer:
Open Sesame to Deferral,23 LAB. L.J. 723, 741 (1972) (dual litigation discussed in double
jeopardy terms).
149. The Board indicated that following Spielberg it would continue to defer to postarbitration awards m section 8(a)(3) discrimination cases although it would no longer defer
to prospective arbitration. See, e.g., General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 94
L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977).
150. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761-62, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215-16. The Board distinguished its Monsanto and Raytheon decisions, in which deferral was not deemed to be proper, by finding
that in those cases the arbitrator decided not to consider the statutory issues at all and
made that intent fairly clear. Id.
151. In John Klann Moving & Trucking Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 1207, 67 L.R.R.M. 1585 (1968),
enforced, 411 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1969), the Board refused to defer because the arbitration
committee never had been presented with, nor had it considered sua sponte, the statutory
question. In DC Int'l Inc., 162 N.L.R.B. 1383, 64 L.R.R.M. 1177, rev'd on other grounds, 385
F.2d 215 (8th Cir. 1967), the Board refused to defer because the issue of an unjustified
discharge was never raised directly or by inference.
152. 213 N.L.R.B. at 762, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216; accord, United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) ("A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award
is not a reason for refusing to enforce the award."); Terminal Transp. Co.,
185 N.L.R.B. 672, 673, 75 L.R.R.M. 1130, 1132 (1970) ("Nor is there reason to disturb the
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the parties to plead and prove all unfair labor practice charges in
the initial arbitration proceedings. 153 By adopting this policy, the
Board intended to foreclose the inefficiency of dual litigation by
denying a party "two bites of the apple." '
By so deferring, and by presuming that the arbitrator had decided the unfair labor practice claims presented below, the Board
in Electronic Reproduction held that the deferral rationales expressed by the Board in two prior cases, Airco Industrial GasesPacific5 ' and Yoruga Trucking, Inc.,156 were overruled except in
unusual circumstances.1 57 In Airco the Board held that it would
not defer to an arbitration award unless the unfair labor practice
issue had been presented to and considered by the arbitrator. 158
Similarly, in Yoruga Trucking, the Board held that the party urging deferral had the burden of proving that the statutory issue actually had been presented to and was resolved by the arbitrator
because the party urging deferral was presumed to have the
strongest interest in establishing that the issue had been previously litigated.1 59 Electronic Reproduction shifted this burden
under its "presumption" onto the party claiming that the issue had
not or could not have been resolved in arbitration. According to
the Board, the policies underlying Airco and Yoruga Trucking had
led to an "artificial separation of issues" and had encouraged fo-

award because the grievance committee, in its decision, made no findings and did not mention the nature of the grievance."). Contra, Local 715, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers v.
NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("In fact, this reasoning appears to contradict
the Board's own decisions to the effect that deferral is not appropriate with respect to an
issue not considered by the arbitration panel.").
153. The majority described the practice of purposefully withholding evidence as "furthering the very multiple litigation which Spielberg and Collyer were designed to discourage." 213 N.L.R.B. at 761, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215-16; cf. Coulson, Title Seven Arbitration in
Action, 27 LAB. L.J. 141, 145 (1976) (arguing for a "waiver" solution to the problems caused
by dual litigation).
154. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215. The issue is, however, whether Congress
intended to permit such dual litigation. See note 14 & accompanying text supra. Variations
of the "two bites of the apple" theory include dual or multiple litigation, and double jeopardy. See generally 213 N.L.R.B. at 761, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215.
155. 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 79 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1972).
156. 197 N.L.R.B. 928, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1972).
157. 213 N.L.R.B. at 760-61, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1214-15.
158. 195 N.L.R.B. at 676-77, 79 L.R.R.M. at 1468.
159. 197 N.L.R.B. at 928, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1499.
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rum shopping and dual, piecemeal litigation.160 In allowing an arbitrator's decision to stand "in the absence of procedural irregularity
or statutory repugnancy,"1 61 however, the Board in Electronic Reproduction severely curtailed the number of unfair labor practice
cases over which the Board could assert jurisdiction.
The dissenting members in Electronic Reproduction, Members
Fanning and Jenkins, strongly opposed such a liberal policy of deferring statutory issues to arbitration because individual rights
protected by the NLRA could be circumvented by union-employer
"sweetheart" agreements 6 2 which contracted the parties out of the
Act through the insertion of arbitration clauses.16 3 In effect, said
the dissenting members, deference to awards issued by arbitrators
who possessed little or no expertise in interpreting the Act
threatened the equal protection and uniform application of the
public rights guaranteed by the NLRA. 1' The "slippery slope" of
liberal deferral, the dissent predicted, could have "no stopping

160. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1215.
161. Id. Contra, Gulf States Asphalt Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 938, 82 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1972)
(Fanning & Jenkins, Members, concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent argued that the majority's presumption placed a burden on the General Counsel to prove that
an arbitrator did not dispose of the statutory violations by "proving a negative, an almost
impossible task." Id. at 941, 82 L.R.R.M. at 1011.
162. A "sweetheart" agreement is a collective bargaining agreement entered into as a result of collusion between an employer and a union. The use of courts to enforce rights obtained by such a method would constitute abuse of legal process. See Sperry v. Retail Clerks
Local 782, 202 F Supp. 708, 710 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
163. 213 N.L.R.B. at 765, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1219-20. The dissent felt that the rationale of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974), should be extended to labor relations
and unfair labor practices cases as well as to Title VII cases. The dissent argued that "arbitration vindicates only the 'contractual right under a collective-bargaining agreement,' and
not the 'independent statutory rights accorded by Congress."' 213 N.L.R.B. at 766, 87
L.R.R.M. at 1220 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 49-50). See also
Joseph T. Ryerson & Sons, 199 N.L.R.B. 461, 464-66, 81 L.R.R.M. 1261, 1266-67 (1972)
(Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
The dissent added that "it also means that the stronger party can compel the weaker to
abandon the protection of the Act through insistence on an arbitration clause and that
'sweetheart' agreements can flout the Act with impunity." 213 N.L.R.B. at 765, 87 L.R.R.M.
at 1219. See also Tyee Constr. Co., 202 N.L.R.B. 307, 310, 82 L.R.R.M. 1548, 1551 (1973)
(Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting) ("Statutory rights are then reduced to contract
rights and will disappear
").
164. 213 N.L.R.B. at 765, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1219. The dissent continued: "Arbitration is
essentially alien to determination of public rights. Arbitrators have no expertise in the interpretation of the Act. The Board does.
[P]ublic rights cannot be the 'plaything of private treaty.'" Id.
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point short of the bottom." 1 6 5
JuDIcIAL RESISTANCE TO DEFERRAL

Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the issues
of either postarbitral or prearbitral deferral by the Board, prior to
Electronic Reproduction the Court tacitly approved of the
Spielberg deferral doctrine. 166 An analogous issue, however, was
addressed by the Court in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo. 16 7 one
month prior to the Board's decision in Electronic Reproduction.In
Gardner-Denver,the Court held that an employee's statutory right
to a trial de novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964168
was not foreclosed by prior submission of the employee's claim to
final and binding arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of
a collective bargaining agreement. 169 If statutory rights were distinct from the employee's contract rights, the -Court stated,
the
17 0
doctrine of selection of remedies or waiver was inapplicable.
The effect the narrow guidelines for administrative deferral
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denverhad on areas
other than Title VII questions was uncertain.11 1 The Court noted
165. Id. In essence, the dissent felt that the Board's jurisdiction was not intended to be
merely one means of dispute resolution, but the primary means of resolution. Id. at 763, 87
L.R.R.M. at 1217.
166. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967); Carey v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
167. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
168. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (current version at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)).
169. 415 U.S. at 49.
170. Id. at 50-51. The Court stated:
The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights is not
vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual occurrence.
[T]he relationship between the forums is complementary
Thus, the rationale behind the election-of-remedies doctrine cannot support
the decision
[T]here can be no prospective waiver of an employee's
rights under Title VII
[W]aiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII.
Id.
171. The Supreme Court certainly was aware of the effect that Gardner-Denverwould
have on similar deferral policies outside the scope of Title VII. See Electronic Reprod. Serv.
Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 766-67, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211, 1220-21 (1974) (Fanning & Jenkins,
Members, dissenting), overruled, Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. -, 103
L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980). But cf. Nash, Board Referral to Arbitration and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver: Some PreliminaryObservations, 25 LAB. L.J. 259, 269 (1974) (predicting that
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that m Title VII cases deference to an arbitral forum was mconsistent with the congressional mandate that federal courts exercise
final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII. 172 Commentators,

therefore, made the analogous argument tLat the Board lacked
congressional authority to refer statutory questions to an arbitrator when final responsibility for enforcement of the NLRA lay with
the Board.17 3 Moreover, the Court m Gardner-Denver said that
deferral to arbitration of Title VII questions made the process of
dispute resolution lengthy, procedurally complex, and costly: 174 ex-

17 5
actly what arbitration was conceived to avoid.
Nonetheless, in Electronic Reproduction the Board circumvented the holding in Gardner-Denverby distinguishing the private right of action under Title VII from the administrative action
under the NLRA. e1 The Board also relied on sections 201177 and
203(d)178 of the LMRA as declarations of the purpose and policy of
the Act.17 9 Subsequent judicial decisions, however, followed the basic rationale of Gardner-Denverand persuaded the Board to discard its Electronic Reproduction presumption.180
In Banyard v. NLRB, 81 the United States Court of Appeals for

Gardner-Denverwill have slight effect upon Collyer and Spielberg policies).
172. 415 U.S. at 56.
173. See, e.g., Novack, supra note 69, at 796-97 (juxtaposing employee's NLRA rights
with Title VII rights).
174. Id. at 58-59. See also Hill, The Effects of Non-Deferrence on the Arbitral Institution: An Alternative Theory, 28 LAB. L.J. 230, 232, 237 (1977); Novack, supra note 69, at
797.
175. See Newman, NLRB Deferral to Arbitrationin UnfairLabor Practices,in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-SIXTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 37, 40 (1974)

("Arbitration started out
many years ago as an informal, quick, cheap way of settling
disputes. It now has become, in general, a very formal, time-consuming, expensive way of
settling disputes
").
176. 213 N.L.R.B. at 762-64, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216-18.
177. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 201, 61 Stat. 152 (1947)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1976)).
178. Id. § 203(d), 61 Stat. 153 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976)).
179. 213 N.L.R.B. at 763, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1217-18. Both sections 201 and 203(d) encouraged the use of arbitration to settle labor disputes. Labor Management Relations (TaftHartley) Act, 1947, ch. 120, §§ 201, 203(d), 61 Stat. 152 (currently codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
171, 173(d) (1976));
180. In Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. -, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980), the
Board expressly overruled Electronic Reproduction, thus reviving the rationale underlying
Airco Industrial Gases and Yoruga Trucking. See notes 155-61 & accompanying text supra.
181. 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the District of Columbia Circuit reversed two NLRB decisions
which gave controlling effect to arbitral decisions involving safety
issues in which the arbitrators upheld the discharge of employees.
The court noted that its approval of Board deferral under the
Spielberg doctrine was "conditioned upon the resolution by the arbitral tribunal of congruent statutory and contractual issues. ' 182
Although the court in Banyard acknowledged the Board's power to
give controlling effect to a prior arbitration award in an unfair labor practice proceeding, 8 3 the court sought to ensure the "congruence" between statutory and contractual issues by holding that the
Board could not defer unless the original Spielberg standards, plus
two additional requirements, were satisfied: first, the arbitrator
clearly must have decided the unfair labor practice issue to which
the Board might later be urged to give deference; and second, the
resolution of the unfair labor practice issue had to have been
84
within the competence of the arbitrator.
The court in Banyard noted that the one sentence statement,
"Claim of Union denied," gave no indication whether the safety
issue had been considered by the arbitrators.1 5 The court held
that the Board could not speculate on what standards arbitrators
applied in reaching their arbitral decisions. 8 6 Moreover, the court
suggested that the record gave no indication whether the standard
applied to the contractual issue was congruent with the standard
that the Board would apply to the statutory unfair labor practice
issues. 117 Thus, Banyard represented a much more moderate position on the question of deferral than did the broad scope drawn in
Electronic Reproduction;8 8 statutory rights protected by the

182. Id. at 348. Absent this congruency between the statutory and contractual issues, "the
Board's abstention goes beyond deferral and approaches abdication." Id.
183. Id. at 345-46.
184. Id. at 347-48. These further limitations on the Board's discretion may be viewed
either as independent requirements, creating a five-pronged Spielberg test, or as extensions
of two of the three existing Sptelberg criteria of whether the proceedings were fair and
regular and whether the result was repugnant to the Act. See Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645
F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1980).
185. 505 F.2d at 348-49.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 348. See Simon-Rose, supra note 54, at 209-12.
188. Commentators have criticized the additional Banyard criteria. See R. GORMON, LABOR LAW 742 (1976); 88 HARv. L. REV. 804 (1975).
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NLRA could not be contracted out of the Act through the use of
"sweetheart" agreements, and individual rights protected by the
Act would be guaranteed more uniformly and could not be made
subject to the limited expertise of arbitrators.
The significance of Banyard was amplified by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Stephenson v. NLRB, 189 which held
that the NLRB had deferred improperly to an arbitration award
ordering the reinstatement of an employee because the evidence
failed to establish that the arbitration panel clearly decided the
unfair labor practice issue. 190 Although the court in Stephenson
noted the Board's laudable intent to encourage the voluntary setr
tlement of labor disputes, 91 the court described Electronic Reproduction as "an unjustifiable extension of its deferral policy"1 92 and

stated that "the Board cannot abdicate its duty to consider unfair
labor practice charges by deferring when it has no lawful or reasonable basis for doing so."' 93
The court in Stephenson noted that the arbitrator's field of
competence was limited to areas of contractual disputes and
should not encroach upon the Board's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices as mandated by section 10 of the NLRA.' The legislative history of section 10 did not indicate that arbitration was
meant as a substitute for Board resolution of statutory issues.
Moreover, arbitrators are not bound to apply definitions of contractual standards proscribed by the Board or the courts. 9 5 Instead, arbitrators are obligated to effectuate the intent of the parties to the contract. 96
The court in Stephenson concluded that the application of the
189. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977). For an analysis of the "clearly decided" and compe-

tence requirements adopted by the court m Stephenson, see id. at 538 n.4. See also, NLRB
Deferral to ArbitrationDecisions, 11 Loy. L.A. L. Rnv. 199 (1977).
190. 550 F.2d at 540-41.
191. Id. at 539. See also Johannesen & Smith, supra note 148, at 741.
192. 550 F.2d at 539.
193. Id.

194. Id. See note 1 supra. See also 88 HARv. L. REv. 804 (1975) (arbitrators not bound to
apply or enforce rights under the NLRA).

195. 550 F.2d at 540; see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) ("The
arbitrator
has no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain
between the parties

").

196. 550 F.2d at 540. See generally Bloch, The NLRB and Arbitration:Is the Board's
Expanding JurisdictionJustified?, 19 LAB. L.J. 640 (1968).
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presumption rationale of Electronic Reproduction would penalize
the employee despite the ambiguity of whether the arbitration
panel was willing or able to consider the unfair labor practice issues.' 7 "Such a result," said the court, "is not consistent with the
policies of the Act."'' 8 The Ninth Circuit thus expressly rejected
the Electronic Reproduction deferral policy and adopted the two
additional criteria for deferral established in Banyard.199 Applying
the five-pronged test of Banyard, the court found that the "clearly
decided" requirement had not been satisfied and remanded the
case to the Board for consideration of the unfair labor practice
charge.2 00 The court declared that substantial and definitive proof
must exist that the statutory issue and evidence expressly were
presented to the arbitrator and that the arbitrator's decision indisputably resolved the statutory issue.2 1

197. 550 F.2d at 541. See Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 836, 94 L.R.R.M.
1474, 1482 (1977) (Fanning & Jenkins, Members, dissenting) (deference based upon ignorance of what the arbitrator decided will lead only to "contractual chaos").
198. 550 F.2d at 541.
199. Id.
200. Id. The court found that the arbitration award met the three Spielberg criteria as
well as the competence requirement. Id. at 540.
201. Id. at 538 n.4; see St. Luke's Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 1173, 1178-79
(7th Cir. 1980) (mere finding of "just cause" for discharge does not dispose of issue of discriminatory motive); Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (record must
yield clear indication that the arbitration panel specifically dealt with the statutory issues
underlying the unfair labor practices charge).
The dissent in Stephenson cautioned that, by restricting the scope of the Board's discretion to defer, the majority was tinkering dangerously with the vitally important arbitration
machinery. 550 F.2d at 542 (Kunzig, J., dissenting). Judge Kunzig said: "There is no need to
move into the area of Banyard. To put more requirements on top of Spielberg may well
make effective use of the arbitration process extremely difficult." Id., see NLRB v. Max
Factor & Co., 640 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. dented, 101 S. Ct. 2314 (1981) (no useful
purpose for precluding deferral because of uncertainty about whether the arbitrator intended to decide the statutory issues as long as the award clearly was not repugnant to the
Act). The dissent reiterated the "two bites of the apple" fear expressed by the Board in
Electronic Reproduction, see note 146 & accompanying text supra, that the parties could
withhold key evidence from the arbitration proceedings in order to obtain de novo review by
the Board should the parties be dissatisfied with the arbitration award. 550 F.2d at 542
(Kunzig, J., dissenting).
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BOARD RESISTANCE TO DEFERRAL

Restricting Collyer
In 1977, the Board in General American Transportation
Corp.2"2 significantly contracted the Collyer doctrine in the
prearbitral context by limiting it to its original scope. General
American Transportationinvolved alleged violations of sections
8(a)(3)203 and 8(a)(1) 20 4 of the Act based on an alleged discrimiatory discharge of a union steward. 0 5 In a three to two decision, the
Board held that it would no longer defer to arbitration in cases
involving alleged violations of individual employee rights under
sections 8(a)(3), 8(a)(1), 8(b)(1)(A), and 8(b)(2) of the Act.208 In so
holding, the Board expressly overruled National Radio and its
progeny,207 which had expanded the Collyer deferral doctrine to
include cases involving alleged violations of sections other than
section 8(a)(3) discrimination. 0 8
Members Fanning and Jenkins, who wrote the majority opinion
202. 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977).
203. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
204. Id. § 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
205. 228 N.L.R.B. at 808, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1483.
206. Id. at 811, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486. Section 8(a)(3) bars employer discrimination m
"hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage" union membership. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1976). See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 527, 80 L.R.R.M. 1718 (1972),
overruled, General Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977). Section
8(a)(1) bars an employer from interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights under § 7 of the NLRA, which grants employees the right to engage
in activities to promote labor organizations. National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1976); see Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M.
1931 (1971). Section 8(b)(1)(A) prohibits union interference with an employee's § 7 rights.
National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1976); see Teamsters
Local 70, 198 N.L.R.B. 552, 80 L.R.R.M. 1727 (1972), aff'd sub nom. Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB,
479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973). Section 8(b)(2) prohibits a union from causing or attempting to
cause an employer to discriminate, against an employee in violation of § 8(a)(3), National
Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976), or from discriminating against a
nonunion employee. Id. § 8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1976); see Newspaper Guild, 201
N.L.R.B. 793, 82 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1973), aff'd sub nom. Enterprise Publishing Co. v. NLRB,
493 F.2d 1024 (1st Cr. 1974).
207. 228 N.L.R.B. at 811, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486. See notes 135-46 & accompanying text
supra for a discussion of National Radio.
208. 228 N.L.R.B. at 811, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486. But see Zimmer, supra note 87, at 196
(generally favoring deferral; favoring National Radio over Collyer approach).
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m General American Transportation and who consistently opposed the Collyer doctrine, 0 9 determined that no public rights
enumerated under the Act could be relegated to a privately selected tribunal.21 0 Dissenting Members Penello and Walther reiterated the Board's National Radio position that deferral to arbitration would be proper in actions involving unfair labor practice
charges.2 1 1 Although Chairman Murphy concurred with the majority, the Chairman refused to join with the majority in totally overruling Collyer In reassessing Collyer and its subsequent extension
to cases not within its original, limited scope, the Chairman distinguished conduct the legality of which turned on an interpretation
of the contract and conduct which, aside from the contract provisions, interfered with statutorily protected rights. 212 In the latter
group of cases, she said, the Board should not defer because resolution of the dispute turns on an interpretation of the Act, rather
than the contract. 21 ' Thus, although the Chairman disagreed with
the majority's position that Board deferral was improper if the dispute concerned purely contractual rights, because the Collyer doctrine had been expanded to include the deferral of disputes concerning statutory rights, the Chairman joined the majority in
expressly overruling National Radio and its progeny 21 4 In theory,
then, the majority of the Board reduced the Collyer prearbitral
deferral doctrine to its original scope.21 5

209. Members Fanning and Jenkins rejected the Collyer policy, stating, "The Board has a
the Board cannot
statutory duty to hear and to dispose of unfair labor practices and
abdicate or avoid its duty by seeking to cede its jurisdiction to private tribunals." General
Am. Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. at 808, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1484. See Atleson, supra note 71
(arguing that excessive harm to individuals outweighs any benefits of deferral to
arbitration).
210. 228 N.L.R.B. at 808-09, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1484. Members Fanning and Jenkins rejected
the argument that Collyer had reduced substantially the Board's workload, considering any
reduction insignificant compared with the sacrifice of statutory protections. Id. at 809-10, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1485-86. The same members railed against the caseload argument in National
Radio. See National Radio Co., 198 N.L.R.B. at 535-36, 80 L.R.R.M. at 1727 (Fanning &
Jenkins, Members, dissenting).
211. 228 N.L.R.B. at 814-16, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1489-91 (Panello & Walther, Members,
dissenting).
212. Id. at 810-11, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1486 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
213. Id., see 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 98.
214. 228 N.L.R.B. at 810-11, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1487 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).
215. See notes 109-13 & accompanying text supra.
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In Roy Robinson Chevrolet,216 the companion case to General
American Transportation,the Board reaffirmed the original Collyer doctrine. The Board held, again three to two, that in cases
involving contractual disputes between the union and the employer, the Board would continue to defer to prospective arbitration, even though the Board also could resolve the disputes under
sections 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3), the refusal-to-bargain sections of the
Act.21 7 Chairman Murphy, again casting the deciding vote, reasoned that the facts presented a pure contract issue particularly
suited to the arbitral process.218 In the subsequent case of Texaco,
Inc.,2 9 however, Chairman Murphy noted that although sectioi
8(a)(5) charges were, in general, appropriate cases for arbitration, a
case involving charges under several sections, only one of which is
a section 8(a)(5) charge, should not be fragmented, but should be
heard in its entirety by the Board.220
Restricting Spielberg
In 1977 the Board also decided Filmation Associates, Inc.,22 in
which the Board held that it would no longer defer in any case
involving an employee's allegation under section 8(a)(4) 222 that he
had been discriminated against for filing an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board or for testifying at a Board proceeding. The
Board ruled that it would not defer even in the context of a completed arbitral award under Spielberg, because ensuring protection
216. 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 94 L.R.R.M. 1474 (1977).
217. Id. at 831, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1474 (Murphy, Chanman, concurring). Section 8(a)(5)

makes unlawful an employer's refusal to bargain collectively with the employee representative. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976); see Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 837, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1931. Section 8(b)(3) bars a union's refusal
to bargain collectively with an employer. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(3) (1976); see Teamsters Local 70, 198 N.L.R.B. 552, 80 L.R.R.M. 1727 (1972), afl'd
sub nom. Nabisco, Inc. v. NLRB, 479 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1973).
218. 228 N.L.R.B. at 831, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1477 (Murphy, Chairman, concurring).

219. 233 N.L.R.B. 375, 96 LR.R.M. 1534 (1977). The majority found that the arbitration
award "[left] unremedied Respondent's misconduct, with no restraint on such misconduct in
the future
" Id. at 376, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1536.
220. Id. at 375 n.2, 96 L.R.R.M. at 1535 n.2.
221. 227 N.L.R.B. 1721, 94 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1977).
222. Section 8(a)(4) makes unlawful an employer's discharge or other discrimmation
against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under the Act. National
Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976).
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against section 8(a)(4) violations was the responsibility of the
Board alone.2 23 The Board's newly established restrictions on
deferral threatened the viability of the Spielberg doctrine. Since
1977, the Board rarely deferred in the prearbitral setting;224 these
cases usually involved pure contract questions that could be resolved without reaching section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice issues.2 25 The Board has shown great reluctance to defer in cases involving alleged violations of section 7 rights226 and in cases where
the union's interests might clash with those of employees.22 7
Since 1977, the results were mixed in cases which fell under the
postarbitral Spielberg doctrine. 228 Although the Board continued
to defer to awards under the Electronic Reproduction rationale if
the arbitrator clearly had not been presented with an unfair labor
practice claim, the Board recognized the judicial resistance to

223. 227 N.L.R.B. at 1721-22, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1470-71. The Board reasoned that it has
"the duty to preserve the Board's processes from abuse" and that this responsibility "may
not be delegated to the parties or to an arbitrator." Id. at 1721, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1471.
224. See Croatian Fraternal Union, 232 N.L.R.B. 1010, 97 L.R.R.M. 1132 (1977) (upholding Administrative Law Judge's decision to defer); Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B.
828, 94 L.R.R.M. 1471 (1977) (holding Administrative Law Judge erred in refusing to defer).
225. In Croatian Fraternal Union, 232 N.L.R.B. 1010, 97 L.R.R.M. 1132 (1977), the employer decided to subcontract work and ban employee telephone calls, and in Roy Robinson
Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 94 L.R.R.M. 1471 (1977), the employer decided to close the
body shop of an automobile dealership.
226. See, e.g., Melones Contractors, 241 N.L.R.B. 14, 100 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1979); Loomis
Courier Serv., Inc., 235 N.L.R.B. 534, 98 L.R.R.M. 1083 (1978), enforcement denied on
other grounds, 595 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1979); Northeast Okla. City Mfg. Co., 230 N.L.R.B.
135, 95 L.R.R.M. 1276 (1977).
227. See e.g., United Parcel Serv., 228 N.L.R.B. 1060, 94 L.R.R.M. 1641 (1977) (Panello &
Walther, Members, concurring); Sioux Quality Packers, 228 N.L.R.B. 1034, 94 L.R.R.M.
1679 (1977) (Walther, Member, concurring) (holding union delay in instituting arbitration
unjustified).
228. Compare Pacific Southwest Airlines, Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1169, 101 L.R.R.M. 1366
(1979) (deferring under Spielberg) and United States Postal Serv., 241 N.L.R.B. 1253, 101
L.R.R.M. 1074 (1979) (deferring to award when Board originally has deferred to process)
and Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 98 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1978) (Chairman Murphy,
and Members Pennello and Truesdale adhering to Spielberg in general; Fanning and Jenkins, Members, concurring and dissenting) with Melones Contractors, 241 N.L.R.B. 14, 100
L.R.R.M. 1477 (1979) (refusing to defer to award because § 8(a)(3) issue not reached in
arbitration) and Max Factor & Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 804, 100 L.R.R.M. 1023 (1978) (refusing to
defer to post-hearing award because § 7 rights not considered), aff'd, 640 F.2d 197 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2314 (1981) and Gould, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 618, 99 L.R.R.M.
1705 (1978) (refusing to defer because unfair labor practice not considered), aff'd, 638 F.2d
159 (10th Cir. 1980).
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deferral expressed by the courts in cases such as Banyard2 29 and
Stephenson.23 0 This judicial resistance lead to the eventual demise
of the broad deferral policy encouraged by Electronic Reproduction231 as heralded initially in Kansas City Star
Co. 232 and finally
233
Inc.
expressed in Suburban Motor Freight,
In Kansas City Star, the Board was faced with two questions
under Spielberg: the degree to which the Board would scrutinize
an arbitrator's decision, and the extent to which the Board would
rely on an arbitrator's decision in ruling on an issue that was not
specifically before the arbitrator but was tied inextricably to issues
that were present in the case.23 4 The Board deferred to the findings
of the arbitrator in resolving the legality of the discharge of several
strikers and the subsequent recission of the collective bargaining
agreement. 235 To answer the questions presented under Spielberg,
the Board in Kansas City Star attempted to determine the meaning of the requirement announced in Raytheon Co. 2386 that the arbitrator have considered the unfair labor practice in his decision.
Although the preferable course might have been for the arbitrator
to pass explicitly on the alleged unfair labor practice, the Board
required only that the arbitrator consider all of the evidence relevant to the unfair labor practice in reaching a decision. 37 Consequently, the Board recognized that the Spielberg doctrine could be
satisfied if the arbitrator's decision implicitly resolved the unfair

229. See notes 181-88 & accompanying text supra.
230. See notes 189-200 & accompanying text supra.
231. See notes 146-65 & accompanying text supra.
232. 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 98 L.R.R.M. 1320 (1978).
233. 247 N.L.R.B. -, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980).
234. 236 N.L.R.B. at 868, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1322; see Truesdale, supra note 73.
235. 236 N.L.R.B. at 867, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1321.
236. 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1963), vacated on other grounds, 326 F.2d 471
(ist Cir. 1964); see notes 78-81 & accompanying text supra.
The requirement of Raytheon that the arbitrator must consider and rule on the unfair
labor practice issue had been integrated by several courts into their analyses of whether the
third Spielberg requirement had been met. See, e.g., Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015 (D.C.
Cir. 1979); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320 (7th Cir. 1976). Other courts
have emphasized that the requirement of Ratheon is separate from the third Spielberg requirement, which these courts maintain was intended to cover an arbitrator's decision
which, on its face, conflicted with the Act. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643
F.2d 965 (3d Cir. 1981); Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
237. 236 N.L.R.B. at 868, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1321-22.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:291

labor practice issue.2"'
The Board in Kansas City Star determined that on the first issue, which concerned the discharge of workers, the arbitrator not
only made all of the factual findings necessary to deciding the legality of the discharges, but he also decided that the discharges did
not violate the Act.239 On the second issue, however, which concerned the recission of the collective bargaining agreement, the arbitrator had not determined the legality of recission under the
Act.2 40 Nevertheless, the Board deferred to the arbitrator's findings
with respect to both issues because the findings were comprehensive and settled the unfair labor practice question.2 4 1 Chairman
Murphy, who agreed with the majority, expressed her disagreement with Electronic Reproduction, which she criticized as showing Board willingness to defer to an arbitrator's award even though
the record did not indicate clearly whether the arbitrator had considered the unfair labor practice issue.24 2
The Board reiterated the holding of Kansas City Star in Atlantic Steel Co., 24 3 in which the Board deferred to the decision of an
arbitrator dismissing an unfair labor practice complaint in its entirety because the arbitrator had found that the employee had
been discharged properly for using obscenity in describing a supervisor to another employee in the hearing of the supervisor. The
arbitrator found that the employee's discharge was for cause because the employee was discharged for insubordination.2 44 Although the arbitrator did not discuss explicitly the alleged unfair

238. Id. at 869, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1324 (Truesdale, Member, concurring). "[Wihile the arbitrator did not pass on the legality of rescission, he was required to rule on every factual and
legal question necessary to the resolution of this issue, since the legality of rescission
turns on whether Respondent could legally discharge the strikers, and whether the strike
was legal." Id. (footnote omitted); see Clara Barton Terrace Convalescent Center, 225
N.L.R.B. 1028, 1029, 92 L.R.R.M. 1621, 1623 (1976) (implicit decision was clearly repugnant
to the Act).
239. 236 N.L.R.B. at 867-69, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1321-22.
240. Id. at 869, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1322. See also Marathon Elec. Mfg. Corp., 106 N.L.R.B.
1171, 32 L.R.R.M. 1645 (1953).
241. 236 N.L.R.B. at 868, 98 L.R.R.M. at 1321-22.
242. Id. at 867 n.1, 98 L.L.R.M. at 1321 n.1. See also Local 715, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical
Workers v. NLRB, 494 F.2d 1136, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (deferral inappropriate with respect
to an issue not considered by the arbitration panel).
243. 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 102 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1979).
244. Id. at 814-15, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1248.
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labor practice, the arbitrator's findings were complete and comprehensive, and were "factually parallel" to the alleged unfair labor
practice.245
The Board finally expressly overruled Electronic Reproduction
in Suburban Motor Freight246 and returned to the pre-Electronic
Reproduction standard for deferral; hereafter, the Board decided
not to defer to an arbitration award that did not indicate whether
the arbitrator decided the statutory issue.247 In Suburban Motor
Freight the Board determined that deference to an arbitration
award that reinstated an employee was not appropriate because
the unfair labor practice charge against the employer for the discriminatory discharge of the employee was not presented to and
considered by the arbitrator.248 The Board reasoned that although

Electronic Reproduction promoted the statutory purpose of encouraging collective bargaining relationships, the Electronic Reproduction deferral policy derogated the equally important policy
of protecting employees' section 7 rights. 249 The Board thus deter-

mined that it could "no longer adhere to a doctrine which forced
employees in arbitration proceedings to seek simultaneous vindication of private contractual rights and public statutory rights or risk
waiving the latter. ' 250 Accordingly, the Board in Suburban Motor

recognized that the union's interest in arbitration may not coincide
with that of the individual 251 and that the ElectronicReproduction
deferral policy sometimes deprived individuals of statutory rights
25 2
under the pretense of encouraging private dispute resolution.
245. Id. at 815, 102 L.R.R.M. at 1249.
246. 247 N.L.R.B. -, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980).
247. Id. at

-,

103 L.R.R.M. at 1114. Before Electronic Reproduction, the party urging

Board deferral had the burden of proving that the issue was litigated before the arbitrator.
See notes 155-59 & accompanying text supra.

248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.,
247
247
Id.,

see Simon-Rose, supra note 54, at 211-12, 215.
N.L.R.B. at _,103 L.R.R.M. at 1114; see Simon-Rose, supra note 54, at 209-12.
N.L.R.B. at _,103 L.R.R.M. at 1114.
see note 227 supra. See also Pacemaker Yacht Co., 253 N.L.R.B. No. 95 (1981)

(deferral not warranted where interests of union are not in substantial harmony with those
of the employee-grievant).
252. 247 N.L.R.B. at -, 103 L.R.R.M. at 1114 (quoting Schatzki, Majority Rule, Excluswe Representation,and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity be Abolished?, 123 U. PENN. L. REV. 897, 909 n.32 (1975) ("One's mind would need to be very fertile, indeed, to conjure up a more shocking sacrifice of individual rights on the altar of
institutionalism.")).
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Under Suburban Motor, therefore, the Board will not defer to an
award if it is shown that evidence relevant to the unfair labor practice has been withheld intentionally from the arbitration proceeding. 53 Although at first blush this return to pre-ElectronicReproduction analysis might appear to encourage a "second bite of the
apple," the petitioner runs the risk that the Board nonetheless will
defer by finding the evidence complete or the Board still may consider the petition on the merits and find
no unfair labor practice
2 54
violation, as it did in Suburban Motor
If the alleged contractual breach also can be challenged as a statutory breach, and the arbitral award implicitly resolves both the
contractual and statutory issues, deference seems proper even if
the statutory issue was not presented specifically to the arbitrator.215 This proposition reconciles the interplay of the principles of
Atlantic Steel and Suburban Motor because neither case requires
an explicit discussion by the arbitrator of the unfair labor practices. By virtue of the factual findings and the similarity of the
contractual and statutory issues, the award indicates that the arbitrator resolved the unfair labor practice issue.2 56

If the statutory claim is incapable of being alleged as a contractual breach, a twofold review seems appropriate. In this situation,
protection of an individual's statutory rights under section 7 of the
Act warrants the full investigative resources and expertise of the
Board. Even if the statutory claim is capable of being alleged as a
contractual breach, however, the dreaded proposition that a party
intentionally would withhold evidence from the arbitration proceeding in order to obtain a "second bite of the apple" is largely
exaggerated in light of the risks the petitioner would run.257 The
more common sequence of events, however, is that at arbitration
an individual may not allege or present evidence in support of an
253. See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1058, 105 L.R.R.M. 1276
(1980).
254. See Truesdale, Recent Issues and Trends Regarding Proceduresand Decisions of
the National Labor Relations Board and the Courts, 4 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 1 9239 (1980).
255. Id., see Bay Shipbuilding Corp., 251 N.L.R.B. 809, 811, 105 L.R.R.M. 1376, 1377-78
(1980) (Truesdale, Member, concurring); Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 866-67, 98
L.R.R.M. 1320, 1321 (1978).
256. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1058, 1058, 105 L.R.R.M. 1276,
1277 (1980).
257. See note 254 & accompanying text supra.
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unfair labor practice because of ignorance of his statutory rights.25
Most individuals or unions will not choose consciously to withhold
evidence and sabotage the arbitration process because this would
increase the cost and tune expended in settling the individual's
2 59

grievance.

If an unfair labor practice rests on factual issues of contract interpretation, however, the arbitrator may be m a superior position

to resolve the statutory issue.280 Similarly, when resolution of the
unfair labor practice issue involves mainly factual, as opposed to

statutory, issues, the Board may be obligated to recognize the arbitrator's decision.2" 1 The Board and the courts, however, do not always agree m characterizing the nature of the controversy accordIng to these standards.28 2
In NLRB v. Pincus Brothers, Inc., 2 5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the Board abused
its discretion in refusing to defer to an arbitrator's decision. In
Pincus Brothers, the arbitrator determined that an employee had
been discharged justifiably for circulating leaflets that were critical
of certain employer policies. 28 The employee filed a charge with
the NLRB alleging that she had been discharged in violation of
section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, which protected employees' section 7
rights. 2 5 The Board subsequently determined that the employee's
activity was protected by section 7, and it refused to defer to the

258. See Truesdale, supra note 254, at 16106.
259. Id.
260. See Bloom v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Stephenson v. NLRB, 550
F.2d 535, 538 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977).
261. See NLRB v. Pincus Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 375 (3d Cir. 1980); Stephenson v.
NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977).
262. See, e.g., Ad Art, Inc. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 669 (9th Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Max Factor &
Co., 640 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2314 (1981); NLRB v. Pincus
Bros.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980).
263. 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980). In Pincus Brothers the court split three ways on the
proper standard of review of the Board's decision: abuse of discretion, legal error, or substantial evidence. The predominant standard of review employed by the courts has been the
abuse of discretion standard. See Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 647, 676
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977). But cf. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., v.
NLRB, 648 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (substantial evidence standard); Roadway Express,
Inc. v. NLRB, 647 F.2d 415 (4th Cir. 1981) (substantial evidence standard, but same result
obtained if abuse of discretion standard had been applied).
264. 620 F.2d at 370-71.
265. Id. at 371.
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arbitrator's decision. 26" The Third Circuit reversed, stating that
the employee's conduct was "arguably unprotected" by the Act
267
and that the arbitrator's award was not repugnant to the Act.

Accordingly, because the conduct characterized by the arbitrator
was permissible under the Act, the Board should have deferred to
the arbitrator's award. Thus, the court emphasized: "We hold only
that where there are two arguable interpretations of an arbitration
award, one permissible and one impermissible, the Board must de26 In finding that
fer to the decision rendered by the arbitrator.""
the subject of arbitration in Pincus Brothers concerned only waivable individual collective bargaining rights, the Third Circuit declared that the societal rewards of arbitration outweighed a need
for uniformity of result or a correct resolution of the dispute in
every case. 269
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disregarded
the holding in Pincus Brothers in NLRB v. Max Factor &
Co., 27 0 in which the court declined to apply an interpretation of the
Board's self-imposed Spielberg criteria that differed from the
Board's historic approach. Although the arbitrator sustained an
employee's discharge as having been for good cause, the court enforced the Board's decision, which held that Max Factor violated
the Act and that the employee should be reinstated. 27 1' The Ninth

Circuit maintained that Pincus Brothers's "arguably unprotected"
standard was inherently imprecise and thus unsuitable as a test in
Spielberg cases. 27 2 Instead, the court in Max Factorobserved that
the Board had wide discretion to defer under Spielberg, and that if
266. Id.
267. Id. at 376-77.
268. Id. at 377. The court in Pincus Bros. relied on the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Douglas
Aircraft Co. v. NLRB, 609 F.2d 352 (9th Cir. 1979), which set aside the Board's refusal to
defer to an arbitration decision that was based on two independent grounds, one permissible and one impermissible under the Act. In Douglas Aircraft the Ninth Circuit held that
the Board could not disregard the permissible ground in making its deferral decision because the award on that basis was not "clearly repugnant" to the Act. Id. at 354-55.
269. 620 F.2d at 374.
270. 640 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2314 (1981).
271. Id. at 200.
272. Id. at 204 & n.7. The court felt that the "arguably unprotected" standard would
force the Board to rule out every arguable rationale for finding the employee's conduct unprotected before it could assert statutory jurisdiction, thereby complicating the determination of the scope of its discretionary powers. Id.
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the Board determined that the arbitrator's decision differed from a
decision that was appropriate under the NLRA, the Board could
decline to defer on the ground that the award was clearly repugnant to the Act.27 3 Foremost, however, the court in Max Factor

found that "[e]nforcmg the Act's protection may be important
enough to outweigh the interest in encouraging arbitration, even in
cases where the conduct was 'arguably unprotected.' ",274 Even if
the controversy could be characterized as mainly factual, the
Board still did not abuse its wide discretion if it refused to defer. 7 5
The subject of arbitration in Pincus Brothers involved not only
individual collective bargaining rights, but also protected statutory
rights, which may not be waived by a collective bargaining agreement.276 Because the Board has primary responsibility and power
to adjudge unfair labor practices, 277 the Board possesses an unmatched expertise in distilling and identifying the coercive effects
of employer conduct.27 For this reason the determination of public
rights that may be "arguably" protected or unprotected falls more
appropriately within the province of the Board. The potential
harm to individuals and the need for uniformity of decision upon
which litigants may rely outweigh the benefits provided by the arbitration machinery. 7 Thus, the Ninth Circuit's view appears
more consistent with the path generally taken by the courts, which
gives deference to the Board's administrative discretion to exercise
its authority over the unfair labor practice charge and refuses to
defer to the arbitral award.
273. Id. at 203-04.
274. Id. Although the Board has wide discretion to apply its Spielberg standards, see

Hawaiian Hauling Serv., Ltd. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 431
U.S. 965 (1977), it cannot announce a new deferral policy and then ignore the new policy,
"thereby leading litigants astray who depended on it." NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co., 439
F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1971).

275. 640 F.2d at 204. The court notedthat the Board, in deciding whether to defer, can
observe factors other than the obviousness of the protected status of the employee's conduct. Id. at 204 n.7.
276. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974) (unlike rights in the economic area,

§ 7 rights cannot be waived by a union in a collective bargaining agreement).
277. National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
278. Cook Paint & Varnish Co. v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
279. See note 209 supra.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:291

CONCLUSION

In the interest of promoting industrial peace and avoiding duplicative litigation, the Spielberg doctrine evolved as a means of accommodating the national policy in favor of the private resolution
of labor disputes through consensual arbitration.2 8 0 The concept of
deferral to the arbitration process, however, is valuable only if the
deferral concept includes adequate restraints against abuse or abdication of responsibility 28 1 Although the delicate balance struck
in Spielberg was altered by the Board's decisions in National Radio, Electronic Reproduction, and similar cases emphasizing the
convenience of the arbitral machinery, the trend in recent years
has been toward a more moderate deferral policy with less risk to
the individual's section 7 rights.2 82
In recent years the dialogue between the Board and the courts
centered on the amount of consideration that the arbitrator paid to
the statutory issue in rendering his decision. Two federal courts of
appeals, in enforcing deferral to arbitration, require that the statu-

tory and contractual issues be "congruent" and that the statutory
issue be "clearly decided,"
tive proof."2 83 The Board
"parallelism" between the
ported by "complete and

as supported by "substantial and definiapproached its standard by requiring a
statutory and contractual issues, as supcomprehensive findings." 28 4 The Board,

however, has not said that the statutory issue must be presented
specifically to the arbitrator. As long as the record indicates by dis-

280. See Boys Mkts. Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 252 (1970), in
which the Supreme Court characterized the arbitral process as "the central institution in
the administration of collective bargaining contracts."
281. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 492 F.2d 662, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Covington, supra
note 59.
282. Compare Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. -, 103 L.R.R.M. 1113 (1980)
(discussed in text accompanying note 249 supra) and General Am. Transp. Corp., 228
N.L.R.B. 808, 94 L.R.R.M. 1483 (1977) (discussed in text accompanying note 202 supra)
and Filmation Assocs., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 1721, 94 L.R.R.M. 1470 (1977) (discussed in text
accompanying note 221 supra) with Roy Robinson Chevrolet, 228 N.L.R.B. 828, 94
L.R.R.M. 1474 (1977) (giving continued support to Collyer) and Atlantic Steel Co., 245
N.L.R.B. 814, 102 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1979) (statutory issues "implicitly" determined by arbitrator) (discussed in text accompanying note 243 supra).
283. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1977); Banyard v.
NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1974); accord, NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643
F.2d 965, 969 n.16 (3d Cir. 1981).
284. See notes 245, 256 & accompanying text supra.
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cussion or factual findings that the arbitrator considered and ruled

on the statutory issue, the Board recognizes an "implicit" resolution of the statutory issue. 285 Although the Board's deferral policy

seems liberal, the burden of proving that the arbitrator resolved
the statutory issue is on the party urging deferral. 286 Hence, the
Board has drawn more distinctly the parameters of the Spielberg
deferral doctrine.
An argument can be made in support of the general competency
of arbitrators to decide difficult statutory questions.28 7 Arbitrators
who are either unwilling or unqualified to resolve statutory questions, however, should not be required to do S0.28 Section 203(d)
of the LMRA 2 9 did not amend the NLRA by substituting the arbitration process for Board jurisdiction, but instead incorporated arbitration into the labor relations arena.290 A broad deferral policy
that derogates the Board's power to resolve statutory questions
would complicate the arbitration process by making deferral more
legalistic, more costly, and less intuitive. 291 Moreover, the inability

of an arbitrator to ensure compliance with the arbitrated decision, 29 2 and the lack of uniformity in arbitrated cases, 293 further
285. See notes 237-38, 252 & accompanying text supra.
286. See notes 158-59, 247 & accompanying text supra.
287. See Dworkn, How ArbitratorsDecide Cases, 25 LAB. L.J. 200, 201-02 (1974); Hill,
The Authority of a Labor Arbitratorto Decide Legal Issues Under a Collective Bargaining
Contract: The Situation After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,10 IND. L. REv. 899 (1977);
Teple, The NLRB Policy of Deferral to Arbitration, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 563, 589-92 (1974);
Witney, The Right Conclusion for the Wrong Reasons: A Rejoinder to Belkin, 25 LAB. L.J.
114 (1974).
288. See Belkin, supra note 26.
289. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, § 203(d), 61
Stat. 154 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976)).
290. See Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886, 52 L.R.R.M. 1129, 1131 (1963); SimonRose, supra note 54, at 216 ("No construction of Section 203(d) supports the proposition
that the Board can employ the arbitration process as an additional forum for the resolution
of unfair labor practice charges.").
291. See Zalusky, Arbitration:Updating a Vital Process, in AFL-CIO AmERICAN FEDERATIONiST, Nov. 1976, at 1 (Arbitration "is taking on the appearance of a courtroom procedure."); Simon-Rose, note 54 supra, at 208 ("If cost becomes an overwhelming factor
the employees are necessarily going to be short-changed.").
292. See Coulson, supra note 153, at 150. But cf. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n v. General Longshore Workers Local 1418, 389 F.2d 369, 371-72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 828 (1968)
(enforcing arbitration award containing a "cease and desist" order).
293. See Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971). See also note
145, supra.
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militate against a broad deferral policy Indeed, a broad deferral
policy could lose the very advantage of arbitration-a quick and
informal mechanism for dispute resolution-thus spelling the end
of arbitration provisions in collective bargaining agreements.94
The more circumscribed deferral policy reestablished in recent
cases such as Kansas City Star, Atlantic Steel, and Suburban Motor preserves the theoretical underpinnings of Spielberg in particular and respects the integrity of the arbitration process in general.
Although these decisions placed limitatons on the function and
scope of the arbitrator's authority, the decisions also delineated a
substantial area of authority for arbitrators.2 95 The arbitrator
should be regarded as more than a hearing officer whose role is
limited to gathering evidence; however, the Board and the courts
have not yet set definite limits on the scope of the arbitrator's authority At present, the Board defers to an arbitrator's award only
if the parties chose the arbitral forum, the proceedings were fair
and regular, no facial errors appear in the arbitrator's factual findings, the arbitrator considered Board law, and his legal conclusion
is consistent with Board law. 98
BRIAN

294.
62 VA.
295.
UMW,
296.

S.

TAYLOR

See Summers, Individual ProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
L. REv. 481, 524 (1976).
See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Gateway Coal Co. v.
414 U.S. 368 (1974).
See text accompanying notes 234-42 supra;Truesdale, supra note 73, at 60.

